9th-12th-Lancers - Year 2002 - Page 0084
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| Regiment | 9th/12th Lancers |
|---|---|
| Year | 2002 |
| Transcription |
82 REGIMENTAL JOURNAL OF THE 9TH/12TH ROYAL LANCERS (PRINCE OF WALES’S) or no grazing to compensate for the totally inadequate forage rations. The Chiereterinary Officer in South Africa noted that the ration scale might be sufficient for a light local pony in peacetime but amounted to nothing less than starvation for a large cavalry troop horse expected to work long hours day after day. Inadequate forage was a prime factor in the deaths of hun- dreds of thousands of horses during that war. The weather was unusually hot- Methuen wrote that the climate was like Dante’s Inferno- exacerbating a severe water shortage. On November 24, three days into the advance, the Regimental diary noted that: both men and horses suffered considerably from lack of water, there being only one small filthy pan for all purposes? Goughie later told his family that the scarcity of water was the most serious of his problems. The historian of the British Cavalry, Lord Anglesey pointedly noted ‘... the only regular cav- alry regiment in Methuen’s force was much debilitated from the start”. In addition to the lack of mobility and the serious logistical problems, intelligence was poor 7 maps were inaccurate and the Regiment was more than once sent on what proved to be a wild goose chase searching for the Boer laager in totally the wrong direction. Methuen began his march to Kimberley on November 20. He won two hard fought battles at Belmont on November 23 and at Enslin, also called Graspan, two days later. At Belmont, the Grenadiers alone had lost thirty-six killed and a hundred more wounded, almost as many as the total Boer losses. In both actions Methuen’s artillery forced the Boers off their defensive positions atop the kopjes- a tactic they soon abandoned. The cavalry and mounted infantry at Methuen’s disposal proved totally inadequate to prevent the Boers from escaping. The Regimental diary noted that it would have required at least a cavalry brigade with horse artillery to have turned their retreat into a rout. Under constant fire, Goughie kept casualties low by keeping constantly on the move, with the result that the horses were ‘dead beat’ after some 12 hours in action. After this spell of incessant work, nearly half the Regiment’s horses were unfit some of them permanently. Pakenham wrote after Graspan: ‘Once again, Methuen had the chagrin of watching the majority of the Boers trotting away across the veldt, unhindered by the exhausted Ninth Lancers or his own field-guns’. 7 On November 26, unreasonably dissatisfied with the perform- ance of his cavalry and using the pretext that Goughie had left the camp unprotected that morning, Methuen sacked, or in Boer War jargon, stellenbosched him: a sad ending to an hon- ourable career of twenty-six years in the Regiment? He wrote to his wife later that day: Ihave sent away C.O. IX Lancers, he is not up to thejob.y Methuen remained defensive on this issue, as late as 1913 justifying his action on the grounds that Goughie was over- stretched. There was evidently a personality clash as from the outset of the campaign the two men had never got on and Goughie had already decided to give up command once the Division had reached Kimberley. Methuen’s action seems unreasonable and does not really stand up to examination. Indeed Goughie’s experience against another formidable enemy in Afghanistan had served the Regiment well by ‘....avoiding those wily snares which had already got so many of our cavalrymen into trouble‘”. He had retained the confidence of his officers and men, he had kept casualties low and he had avoided having any of his outnumbered force cut offby the wily Boers, a fate which had befallen Lt. Col.Bernhard Moller, commanding 18th Hussars, who blundered into a force of 1 5,000 Boers at the Battle of Talana Hill in October 1899. One squadron of the Regiment, 240 men in all, went into the bag. Unlike Goughie, Moller had never been on active service before and he ignored advice from two of his squadron leaders, both of who had war experience and who succeeded in extricating their squadrons, not to charge too far behind Boer lines. On November 30, the day he sailed from Cape Town, Goughie wrote to Methuen, stating that he would retire from the Army when he reached England. He asked for an inquiry and strong- ly defended his record: I myself feel quite certain that I have done all that was in my power to help your victories in every occasion and that I have lost no opportunities. I hope you will consider that with 3 squadrons I have been trying to do the work of a brigade of Cavalry and that my horses were ofien quite exhausted and hardly able to raise a trot He was remarkably candid: I own that I took insufficient pre- cautions for the safety of the camp... afier the battle of Graspan. But when I received orders to send out 3 officers patrols I believed that such only was your wish and that the enemy was being watched for from the posts on the Kopjes and that this was being done in consideration of the horses. A Squadron was saddled in camp and ready to turn out and when I heard of one of the patrols... being cut up I came to headquar- ters to report it and to ask if I might not send out a squadron.... I can assure you that I had no easy task at the battle of Graspan with my small force surrounded by the enemy- under artillery fire- and far away from all support— to keep out of trouble: which I not only did but I must have done some harm to the enemy by firing at them, and I actually did pursue them as far as my horses could go but owing to their exhausted state I could not catch them. Replying on December 4, Methuen made a strange comment, which appears to vindicate Goughie I quite understand that you could not do more than you did.“ Goughie never did get the inquiry which he had reasonably requested. In essence he had been made a scapegoat and the real responsibility for this unfortunate situation lay far higher up the chain of command. On November 26, the day he was stellenbosched, one of Rimington’s Guides wrote: ‘Want of frigates was to be found on Nelson’s heart as he said...and I am sure... that want of cavalry will be written in poor Methuen’s’. The Times History of the War noted: If Sir R .Buller had fiilly appreciated the value of cavalry. . .he would have delayed Methuen’s start until his force could be properly equipped.” Anglesey concluded that Methuen’s: thousand or so horsemen were barely sufficimt for minimal screening purposes. There were none left fro threatening the enemy’s rear, speedily seizing advanced positions or... for effective pursuit.‘3 Methuen’s ability as a general can be questioned. At the battle of the Madder River on November 28, Methuen ignored two warnings from Major (later Brigadier) Malcolm Little, Goughie’s successor as C0 of the Regiment, that the Boers, now led by General Jacobus Hercules (Koos) De la Rey, one of the outstanding commanders of the war, were dug in in low- lying positions along the river. Methuen’s frontal assault was a failure, resulting in nearly 500 casualties. He was wounded and his Chief of Staff killed. 13 days later he was badly beaten by De la Rey at Maggersfontein, one of the worst British defeats of the war, incurring over 900 casualties. The defend- ing Boers had less than 250. On the following morning he actually berated the Highland Brigade, who had borne almost all the casualties, earning himself the bitter hatred of his troops. When Lord Roberts succeeded Buller as C-in-C, he demoted Methuen, writing: I am resolved that he should not be given any independent command.‘A Sadly, Goughie did not have long to enjoy his retirement. In June 1904, he and May were driving in their dogcart near the town of Kelso when the rein caught under the horse’s tail, caus- ing it to bolt. He leaned forward to release the rein, the horse swerved and the dogcart mounted the curb, throwing him out. May managed to retain her seat until the horse failed to take a bend in the road and collided with a hedge, bringing the vehicle to a temporary stop. May jumped out and ran to where Goughie was lying unconscious, some fifty yards away. Goughie had fall- en on his head and was still breathing when May reached him but he was dead by the time two doctors, summoned from the |
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