9th-12th-Lancers - Year 2001 - Page 0056
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| Regiment | 9th/12th Lancers |
|---|---|
| Year | 2001 |
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56 REGIMENTAL JOURNAL OF THE 9th/12th ROYAL LANCERS (PRINCE OF WALES’S) Ex SAIF SAREEA II Sep to Oct 01 RHQ m the desert Ex SAIF SAREEA II was a Joint and Combined exercise in and around Oman. It involved over 20,000 British Army, Royal Navy, Royal Marines and RAF Personnel. The Sultan of Oman’s Armed Forces deployed in similar numbers for what was billed as the largest deployment of British Forces overseas since the Gulf War. It was quite clear from the start that British and Omani forces were equal partners in a series of events, whose like and scale we may never see again. Deployments for the exercise started in February and personnel were still in the- atre at the end of November. There can be no doubt that the appalling events of the llth of September affected all those in theatre for the duration of the deployment and beyond. There were to be three Tiers of Training. Tier 1 was designed to allow 4 Armoured Brigade to achieve the all arms training objec- tives which they required to fulfil their part in the United Kingdom’s Joint Rapid Reaction Force. Tier 2 training was GOC 1 (UK) Armoured Division’s test exercise to validate 4 Armoured Brigade’s procedures and confirm their readiness to assume their place as the first High Readiness Brigade. Tier 3 Training involved integration training with our Omani friends and a Live Exercise, which culminated in an impressive Firepower Demonstration involving all three services from both countries. Regimental Headquarters, A Squadron, Headquarters Squadron and the LAD provided the opposition force, the OPFOR, for Tier 1 and 2 training, reinforced by D Squadron, Queen’s Royal Lancers and a mixed Gurkha and MILAN Platoon from the First Battalion, The Highlanders. For Tier 3 training, the OPFOR joined 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines and a Battlegroup from the Royal Army of Oman to provide a large and capable enemy force designed to give the Joint Force Component Commander as much of a headache as possible. On many occasions, the OPFOR were too successful and were forced to act as tethered goats. B Squadron provided the reconnaissance ca bility for 4 Armoured Brigade, and on occasion the Land Component Commander, throughout the Exercise, where they acquitted themselves with distinction, as you will see form OC B Squadron’s notes. The Squadron remains committed to working with that Brigade as part of the Joint Rapid Reaction Force throughout 2002. As I write this article, I am very conscious that many readers will have fought the Germans, the Italians and the Iraqis in dif- ferent deserts and there will be a wealth of related experience and opinion. I am in no doubt that many experiences and opin- ions will be shared, but others may give rise to comment. We should all remember that different circumstances and situa- tions will inevitably give rise to different emotions. We did as much pre deployment training as we could in Hohne. The agreed plan was that the enemy elements would train and configure themselves as the same sort ofOPFOR Battlegroup as found at the British Army Training Unit Suffield in Canada. As the Regiment is due to be the OPFOR at BATUS in 2002, this was a clear opportunity to validate the procedures and tactics for Canada well in advance to ensure we could be as free thinking and aggressive a force as possible. A detailed program of lec- tures from the wise and enthusiastic outlined the many ways in which we could die in the desert. The fauna. poor water, no water, too much sun, too much cold, local food, indeed most things would all conspire against us in whatever way they could. The mosquitoes were large enough to carry away the unwary and those who could not be sucked entirely dry would suffer from any one of 2000 different incurable forms of malaria. The Quartermaster managed to extrude desert combat clothing from the supply chain and what was not available had to be bought from the PRI, especially desert boots. Most of those deploying thought they spent an average of £130 on buying what they felt they needed, which the Army, despite the most diligent efforts of the QM, would not or could not supply. ‘—_-— We// done /ads , we’re not /ost yet |
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