9th-12th-Lancers - Year 1986 - Page 0089
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| Regiment | 9th/12th Lancers |
|---|---|
| Year | 1986 |
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THE 9TH/lZTH ROYAL LANCERS REGIMENTAL JOURNAl Making Use of Experience I: The Rt. Hon. l-‘naelt Pym If anyone had said, when I joined the regiment on the edge of the desert outside Cairo in August 1942, that one day I would chair the Defence Council with the Chiefs of Staff and Defence Ministers all present, no one would have believed it — least of all me. Life is full of surprises and when I did find myself in that position in 1979, among the equipment I brought with me was three years experience of 9L in war. It was extremely valuable. The basic fighting unit is still a regiment on the ground. and for all the obvious import» ance of the NATO Alliance or the nuc- lear deterrent. for example, our regi- ments and battalions remain the bedrock of our defences. To have served with one of them is an experience one can never forget. On arrival l was posted to B Squad- ron, in command of No 3 Troop. Within an hour l was despatched in a truck by Major Laurie, the Squadron Leader. on a triangular route to three random map references. This was the beginning of the immediate acclimatisation to the strange conditions of the desert. All new intakes are green but never has colour changed so quicklyl in a matter of days, under the influence of the ex- perienced hands, one became accust- omed both to the habits and discom» forts of desert life and to its simplicity. Later on, when the regiment played its part in the Italian campaign, many of us felt the desert was infinitely to he preferred. There were no rivers, no houses, no population — nothing, ex- cept a vast terrain upon which the rival will and skill and firepower of the two adversaries could be put to the test. I was fortunate in arriving at the same time as the Sherman tanks with which B it C Squadrons were equipped. Their 75mm guns were more nearly a match for the German 88mins than anything the Regiment had had before, and the armour was thicker. This did not pre- vent them from being penetrated, as was my own tank on the first day at Alalnein through the front of the hull. It was just lucky that it did not brew up. but some were not so lucky. My crew and I were remounted in less than 24 hours. Later on we were hit again but without damage. How many hits we scored in our turn cannot be known but every flash of light that gave us the evidence of a direct hit elated the spirits and brought victory that much nearer. We slogged it out for a fortnight, for 20 hours a day, until the enemy was in full retreat. My purpose in mentioning these few details of one battle is simply to indicate the depth of the experience. Later on in life, and contrary to what I expected at the time, l had occasion to draw upon that experience in all the offices of Slate I have held. In 1979, as Secretary of State for Defence, 1 found myself in the lead role in two momentous decisions: the mod- ernisation of NATO‘s Independent Nuclear Force and of Britain's strat- egic deterrent. This is not the place to argue the options or the case for the one that was chosen, nor even to recount the effort, the time and the thinking that colleagues and I put into it. But it is the place to say that of cour- se my war-time experiences with 9L affected my approach to these issues. in the circumstances as they existed then, how best could we preserve peace and avert war? Those were — and are — the relevant questions. They represent our clear objective. There is no certain way to achieve it. Always there are options. What we sought to do was to choose the way which seemed to us, in all the circumstances and in the light of all the facts, to be the surest way to achieve the objective. On another occasion my experience was valuable in a different way. I was on an official visit to China. the first Secretary of State to go there after the 1979 election. [t was clear that the Chin- ese wanted to make as favourable an impression on me as I wanted to on them. After two days of talks and ban- quets in Peking, I was taken to see the Great Wall followed by a visit to their 61h Tank Division stationed nearby. They put on the usual kind of armoured display and I was suitably impressed, all the more so in view of the age of their equipment. indeed one of the purposes of my visit was to discuss the modernisation of their equipment. This display was followed by a lunch, an animated occasion that fitted well with the success of our discussions so far. It was at this point that I decided to reveal to my hosts my military past. The result was electric. What was al- ready a developing friendship suddenly became the occasion for a series of toasts — one at every table, and there were 15! They then showed me more of their equipment than was originally intended and were very candid about its shortcomings, which was a good basis for doing more business. More dramatically. war-time exper» ience was obviously invaluable during my time in Northern Ireland and during the Falklands crisis. The military dec- isions of that campaign were taken of course by the Chiefs of Staff. to give effect to the War Cabinet's decisions. In arriving at those decisions it was extremely helpful to have a clear con- cept of what the military realities on the ground were likely to be. The other politician members of that War Cabinet with war-time experience were Lord Whitelaw and Sir Michael Havers. My principal role as Foreign Secretary was to try and find a way to secure the withdrawal of the Argentines without recourse to force. The likelihood of achieving this always seemed remote because of the political realities in Arg- entina. When the first and second sets of peace proposals were turned down by the Argentines i decided to prepare our own proposals, so that the British people and the whole world could know what we were prepared to agree to. When presented to the United Nations on 17th May, the reception of these proposals was remarkably favourable because they went further towards |
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